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S.
No.
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Nat.
Policy on Street Vendors 2004
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Response
/ Suggestion 1
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Response
/ Suggestion 2
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Query
/ Remark
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1
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The
right to carry on trade or business mentioned in Article
19(1)g of the Constitution, on street pavements, if properly
regulated cannot be denied on the ground that the streets are
meant exclusively for passing or re-passing and no other use.
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This
indicates that there is some conflict in allowing street
vendors, and “regulation” is the key. This means that the
onus for smooth functioning is on the Civic Authority.
Another
quote that says that “streets are not meant exclusively for
passing or re-passing and no other use…” is also
questionable.
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The
policy says that street vendors constitute 2% of the population
of a metropolis – even if this is true, the city cannot
support 2% of its population who exist outside the framework
of the law – and use public streets and pavements for their
trade – restriction and regulation is essential
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If
the Policy is based on such concepts, it is questionable, and
faulty, and there is a limited chance of success, as most
civic authorities across the country are already over-burdened
and unable to even regulate themselves, leave alone taking on
additional regulatory roles.
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2
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this
important section of the urban population finds recognition
for its contribution to society, and is conceived of as a major initiative for urban poverty alleviation.
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The
Policy says that ensuring employment of the street vendors is
mandatory for the State, as this is a major initiative for
poverty alleviation. While this statement is not untrue, it is
an isolated and over-simplified view of the situation.
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a serious misinterpretation to extend it to hawking.
Another slum situation in the making
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3
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Definition
A street
vendor is broadly defined as a person who offers goods or services
for sale to the public without having a permanent built up
structure but with a temporary static structure or mobile
stall (or headload). Street vendors may be stationary by
occupying space on the pavements or other public/private
areas, or may be mobile in the sense that they move from place
to place carrying their wares on push carts or in cycles or
baskets on their heads, or may sell their wares in moving bus
etc. In this policy document, the term urban vendor is
inclusive of both traders and service providers, stationary as
well as mobile vendors and incorporates all other local/region
specific terms used to describe them, such as, hawker,
pheriwalla, rehri-patri walla, footpath dukandars, sidewalk
traders, etc.
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The
definition of street vendors is too broad while attempting to
be inclusive, but this is not helpful, as the various
different kinds of street vendors (for e.g.: mobile and
temporary, static) would require different regulations.
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4)
cl.:4.1.1
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The
demarcation of hawking zones should be city/town specific. If
aspirants to such location exceed the number of spaces
available, excess may be regulated by fees or lottery and not
discretionary licenses. The ‘no-vending zones’ may be
notified both in terms of location and time.
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It
is recommended that legitimate hawking zones are to be
provided, within which regulation of numbers of vendors is
required, as the numbers cannot be unlimited. This indicates
that those not included within the limited and legitimate
numbers and space, will be excluded and continue to operate
outside this framework. This will require:
a)
The hawking zones and numbers to be continually modified and
increased. (similar to slums and cut-off date)
b)
Regulation / Control of both the legitimate and excluded
street vendors by the civic authorities – a further
additional burden.
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Based on this logic, even whatever hawking zones are
identified can be
challenged via a PIL in due course.
although 'nominal fees' can never regulate 'excess'
and so it will become a 'lottery' based system which is never
sustainable due to the hardship it causes to the existing
beneficiaries and also because of unionisation, etc.
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Clearly
defined criteria needed for hawking zones and non-hawking –
these are then applied and accepted – irrespective of who
applies them
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5)
4.1.1
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It
should take into account the natural propensity of the Street
vendors to locate in certain places at certain times in
response to patterns of demand for their goods/services.
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This
is looking at the situation in isolation: the same places at
the same particular times have increased vehicular traffic and
high human pedestrian traffic, and if the hawkers are also
permitted in such areas, the existing systems will be
overloaded and collapse.
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6)
4.1.1
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Mobile
urban vending should be permitted in all areas even outside
the designated vendors’ markets, unless designated as
‘no-vending zone’ through a participatory process.
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A
cap is required on the mobile vendors based on the carrying
capacity of the area.
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7)
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Designation
of vendors markets / no-vending zones should not be left to
the sole discretion of any civic or police authority but must
be accomplished by a participatory process by a Town Vending Committee ( which for large towns / cities may be
constituted on the basis of wards ) whose membership may be as
follows:
- Municipal Authority - Traffic and Local
Police
- Public Land Owning
Authority
-Associations (Market,
Traders, Resident
Welfare, slum
&
chawl etc.)
- Representative from
associations
of
Street
vendors (
static
& mobile)
- Representative from
lead
Nationalized
Bank /
Commercial
Bank.
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Town
Vending Committee can be used to implement and regulate the
schemes as set out by the SC / MCGM
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8)
4.1.1
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make the plans conducive and adequate for hawkers
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shouldn't it be for the citizens as pedestrians and,
maybe, as consumers?
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9)
4.1.2
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space should be designated for vendors' markets ...
to 2.5% of the total city population." "(See
Annexure -I for indicative norms
provided in Delhi Master Plan) "
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Other
recommendation of 1 hawker per 1000 population is more
feasible – hence 60 hawkers per 60,000 population of a
Councillor Ward
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that is an extremely high percentage. The Delhi
Master Plan is quite scary. e.g. 4 hawkers per 10 shops.
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10
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The
Committee should ensure that provisions for space for
vendors’ markets are pragmatic, consistent with formation of
natural markets, sufficient for existing demand for vendor’s
goods and services, as well as likely increase in line with
anticipated population growth.
Provisions of space may include temporary designation
as vendors’ markets (e.g. as weekly markets) whose use at
other times may be different (e.g. Public Park, parking lot).
Timing restriction on urban vending should correspond
to the needs of ensuring non-congestion of public spaces /
public hygiene.
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11)
4.1.3:
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Provision
for electricity
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great
potential for misuse on streets and pavements, could even
cause accidents – maybe provided in the vending markets
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12)4.2
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no
licensing, but regulation through registration – and the
registration process is then further detailed
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The
Registration process that is detailed is however extremely
simplistic and hardly allows for an efficient system of
regulation:
a)
no restriction on numbers – unrealistic and unmanageable
b)
market forces will regulate the numbers – too unpredictable
a force to depend on, besides being too powerful to regulate
– look at the examples of the real estate prices in Mumbai,
etc. – it is difficult to control market forces despite
regulation.
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13)
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Relocation
and Rehabilitation
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can
be done once, not repeatedly, for every new batch of hawkers
that come – hence an unsustainable exercise.
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14)
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Evictions:
to be stopped
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these
are undertaken because the law is being broken.
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15)
6.1
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recommends
repealing of IPC sections 283 and section 34
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this
is again an isolated view, as these sections in the IPC and
Police Act are required as they cover a broad issue of safety
– and hence cannot be repealed only in the interests of
street vendors – as it is in the interests of public at
large.
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16)9.2.
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important to organise the street vendors for creation
of a united front for
negotiation / protection of their rights
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something similar needed for resident citizens also.
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Overall
comments
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a)
This is not a balanced policy
b)
The Policy presents simplistic solutions for a complex issue
c)
The recommendations made do not consider the long term impacts
and repercussions on related issues.
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And the ultimate irony is that all that happens is
that some people become eligible to hawk, while for others,
Articles 39 (a) and (b) are denied. And so the circle becomes
complete, and life remains as messy as ever for
citizens and cities.
Solutions, by definition, are those which lead to a
stable end-point.
Policies such as these start with a certain set of
assumptions and logic and
philosophies and then to force a certain stable
end-point very conveniently
disregard / forget those tenets.
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1. The policy has been framed by the Ministry of
Urban Development and
Poverty Alleviation.
By definition, this would be a body already inclined
towards hawkers.
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